Philosophy of Nyaya Prama
Nyāya (literally “rule or method of reasoning”) is a leading school of philosophy within the “Hindu umbrella”—those communities which saw themselves as the inheritors of the ancient Vedic civilization and allied cultural traditions. Epistemologically, Nyāya develops of a sophisticated precursor to contemporary reliabilism (particularly process reliabilism), centered on the notion of “knowledge-sources” (pramāṇa), and a conception of epistemic responsibility which allows for default, unreflective justification accorded to putatively veridical Cognition. It also extensively studies the nature of reasoning in the attempt to map pathways which lead to veridical inferential cognition. Nyāya’s methods of analysis and argument resolution influenced much of classical Indian literary criticism, philosophical debate, and jurisprudence. Metaphysically, Nyāya defends a robust realism, including universals, selves, and substances, largely in debate with Buddhist anti-realists and flux-theorists. Nyāya thinkers were also India’s most sophisticated natural theologians. For at least a millennium, Nyāya honed a variety of arguments in support of a baseline theism in constant engagement with sophisticated philosophical atheists, most notably Buddhists and MīmāṁSakas (Hindu Ritualists).
The Nyāya-sūtra opens with a list of its primary topics, sixteen items which may be grouped into the following four categories: epistemology, metaphysics, procedures and Elements of inquiry, and debate theory. That Nyāya’s initial topic is epistemology (pramāṇas, “knowledge-sources”) is noteworthy. Both the sūtras and the commentarial tradition argue that epistemic success is central in the search for happiness, since we must understand the world properly should we desire to achieve the goods it offers.Vātsyāyana claims that while Nyāya’s metaphysical concerns overlap with other, more scripturally-based Hindu schools, what distinguishes Nyāya is a reflective concern with evidence, doubt and the objects of knowledge. He further defines Nyāya’s philosophical method as the “investigation of a subject by means of knowledge-sources”. Importantly, the pramāṇas are not simply the means by which individuals attain veridical cognition. They are also the final court of appeals in philosophical dispute. Uddyotakara thus claims the best kind of demonstrative reasoning occurs when the pramāṇas are deployed in concert in order to establish a fact.
The four pramāṇas are perception, inference, analogical reasoning, and testimony. We will discuss them in order. Then, we will consider Nyāya’s theory of knowledge in general.
Perception
This sūtra provides four conditions which must be met for cognition to be perceptual. The first, that cognition arises from the connection between sense faculty and object, evinces Nyāya’s direct realism. It is such connection, the central feature of the causal chain which terminates in perceptual cognition, which fixes the intentionality of a token percept. Uddyotakara enumerates six kinds of connection (sannikarṣa) to account for the fact that that we perceive not only substances, but properties, absences, and so on: (i) Conjunction (samyoga), the connection between a sense faculty and an object; (ii) inherence in what is conjoined (saṁyukta-samavāya), the connection between a sense faculty and a property-trope which inheres in an object; (iii) inherence in what inheres in what is conjoined (saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya), the connection between a sense faculty and the universal which is instantiated in a property-trope; (iv) inherence (samavāya), the kind of connection which makes auditory perception possible; (v) inherence in what inheres (samaveta-samavāya), the connection between the auditory faculty and universals which inhere within sounds; (vi) qualifier-qualified relation (viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva), the connection which allows for the perception of inherence and absence in objects. In all cases, the perceptual cognition is born of connection between a sense faculty and an occurrent fact or object.
The second condition, that the cognition produced is not dependent on words, has a somewhat complicated interpretive history. Generally, Nyāya holds that ordinary perception involves concept deployment. Therefore, this restriction does not endorse a view held by the Buddhist Dignāga and his followers, that genuine perception is non-conceptual (kalpanā-apodha). Still, the meaning of avyapadeśya is disputed amongst Naiyāyikas. On one reading, this qualification serves the purpose of distinguishing between perceptually and testimonially generated cognitions. The latter also require information provided by the senses but further require the deployment of semantic and syntactic knowledge. An allied reading suggests that while involving the application of concepts, perception of an object is often causally prior to speech acts involving it.
The third, “non-deviating” condition blocks false cognitions, like the misperception that an oyster shell is a piece of silver, from the ranks of pramāṇa-born. This is tied to the Nyāya notion that pramāṇas are by definition inerrant, and that false cognitive presentations are not truly pramāṇas but pseudo-pramāṇas (pramāṇa-ābhāsa). Though we may mistakenly take a pseudo-pramāṇa, like the illusion of a person in the distance, to be the real thing, it is not. “Perception” and similar pramāṇa-terms have success grammar for Nyāya.
The fourth, “determinate” condition blocks cognitions which are merely doubtful from the ranks of the pramāṇa-born. Dubious cognitions, like that of a distant person at dusk, do not convey misleadingly false information, but being unclear, they do not properly apprehend the object in question. It could be a person or a post. As such, one neither correctly grasps its character nor falsely takes it to represent accurately a certain object. Later Naiyāyikas, most notably Vācaspati Miśra, read the qualifiers “notdependent on words” and “determinate” disjunctively, in order to say that perception may be non-propositional or propositional. However anachronistic this may be as an interpretation of the Nyāya-sūtra, this division is accepted by later Nyāya.
Inference (anumāna)
Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.5 defines inference as follows:
An inferential cognition is preceded by that [perception], and is threefold: from cause to effect, from effect to cause or from that which is commonly seen.
This definition is somewhat elliptical. But it focuses on the fundamental character of inference: it is a cognition which follows from another cognition owing to their being conceptually connected in some way. Etymologically, anumāna means “after-cognizing”. Inference follows from an earlier cognition, “that” in the sūtra above. Vātsyāyana interprets “that” (tat) to refer to a perceptual cognition, and suggests that perceptual cognition precedes inference in two ways: (i) to engage in inference requires having perceptually established a fixed relationship between an inferential sign and the property to be inferred, and (ii) perceptual input triggers inference in that one must cognize the inferential sign as qualifying the locus of an inference. He provides a more explicit definition of inference as “a ‘later cognition’ of an object by means of cognition of its inferential sign”
Second, inference is triggered by the recognition of a sign or mark, whose relationship with some other object (property or fact) has been firmly established. The primary cause of an inferential cognition is an immediately prior “subsumptive judgment” (parāmarśa) which grasps an inferential sign as qualifying an inferential subject (the locus of the inference), while recollecting the sign’s invariable concomitance with some other fact or object. The two fundamental requirements for inference are, therefore, awareness of pakṣadharmatā, the inferential mark’s qualifying the locus of the inference, and vyāpti, the sign’s invariable concomitance with the target property or probandum. A paradigmatic act of inference to oneself is: “There is fire on that mountain, since there is smoke on it,” which is supported by the awareness that fire is invariably concomitant with smoke. Naiyāyikas examine and standardize the conditions under which invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between a probans and a target fact is established.
Analogical Reasoning (upamāna)
Nyāya-sūtra1.1.6 defines analogyas follows:
“Analogy makes an object known by similarity with something already known”.
Naiyāyikas commonly frame analogy as a means of vocabulary acquisition, and it has a severely restricted scope compared with the other pramāṇas. The standard example involves a person who is told that a water buffalo looks something like a cow and that such buffalo are present in a certain place in the countryside. Later, when out in the countryside, he recognizes that the thing he is seeing is similar to a cow, and therefore is a water buffalo. The cognition “That thing is a water buffalo,” born of the recollection of testimony regarding its similarity with a cow and the perception of such common features, is paradigmatically analogical. Though most of the other schools either reduce analogy to a more fundamental pramāṇaor conceive of it in very different terms (Mīmāṁsā conceives of it as the capacity by which we apprehend similarity itself), Nyāya contends that the cognition in question is sui generis analogical, though it incorporates information from other pramāṇas.
Testimony (śabda)
Testimony is defined as follows:
“Testimony is the assertion of a qualified speaker”.
The semantic range of āpta (“authority,” “credible person”) includes expertise, trustworthiness, and reliability. Vātsyāyana claims that an āpta possesses direct knowledge of something, and a willingness to convey such knowledge without distortion . It is clear, though, that Nyāya does not require any kind of special expertise from such a speaker in normal situations. Nor does a hearer need positive evidence of trustworthiness. Mere absence of doubt in the asserter’s ability to speak authoritatively about the issue at hand is enough. Testimony is thus thought of as a transmission of information or content. A person attains an accurate cognition through some pramāṇatoken. In a properly functioning testimonial exchange, she bestows the information apprehended by the initial cognition to an epistemically responsible hearer. On such grounds, Uddyotakara notes that testimonial utterances may be divided into those whose contents are originally generated by perception or by inference. Jayanta likewise claims that the veridicality or non-veridicality of a testimonial cognition is dependent on the speaker’s knowledge of the content of her statement and her honesty in relating it. Vātsyāyana illustrates a levelheaded frankness about testimony’s importance, noting that “in accord with knowledge gained by testimony, people undertake their common affairs.” Uddyotakarasimilarlyrecognizes that testimony has the widest range of any source of knowledge, far outstripping what one may know from personal perception, inference or analogy.
Non-pramāṇa Epistemic Capacities
From the sūtra period, Nyāya recognizes a number of epistemic capacities which are nevertheless considered non-pramāṇa. They are not considered independent pramāṇas for one of two reasons: (i) they are reducible to subspecies of other pramāṇas, or (ii) they do not produce the specific kind of cognitions which a pramāṇa must deliver. A core locus of debate amongst classical Indian thinkers is the nature and number of pramāṇas. Nyāya contends that the above four are the only irreducible sources of knowledge, which subsume all other kinds.
Asatkaryavada
In Asatkaryavada i. e. the effect does not pre-exist in its material cause but is a new creation, a real beginning. They said, if the cloth already exists in the threads, then why should not the threads serve the purpose of the cloth?
A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produce the same effect and the same effect is produced by the same cause. Plurality of causes is ruled out.,
Pramanas are the means of valid knowledge in Nyaya philosophy. There are four pramanas: pratyaksha, anumana, upamana, and shabda.
Pratyaksha is direct perception. It is the most reliable means of knowledge. It is the knowledge that is obtained through the senses. For example, when you see a table, you have direct perception of the table.
Anumana is inference. It is a means of knowledge that is based on the observation of a certain relationship between two things. For example, if you see smoke, you can infer that there is fire.
Upamana is comparison. It is a means of knowledge that is based on the comparison of two things. For example, if you have never seen an elephant before, you can compare it to a cow to get an idea of what it looks like.
Shabda is verbal testimony. It is a means of knowledge that is based on the authority of a reliable person. For example, if you hear a reliable person say that there is a God, you can accept that as knowledge.
Arthapatti is presumption. It is a means of knowledge that is based on the assumption of something that is not directly observed. For example, if you see a closed door, you can presume that there is someone behind the door.
Abhava is negation. It is a means of knowledge that is based on the negation of something. For example, if you see a white cow, you can negate the existence of a black cow.
Anvaya-vyatireka is the method of agreement and difference. It is a method of reasoning that is used to determine the cause of something. For example, if you see that fire is always accompanied by smoke, you can infer that fire is the cause of smoke.
Nigamana is the conclusion of an argument. It is the final step in the process of reasoning. For example, if you have observed that fire is always accompanied by smoke, and you have inferred that fire is the cause of smoke, then you can conclude that fire is the cause of smoke.
Tarka is the process of reasoning. It is the process of using the pramanas to arrive at a conclusion. For example, if you want to know whether there is a God, you can use the pramanas of pratyaksha, anumana, upamana, and shabda to arrive at a conclusion.
Vada is a formal debate. It is a process of argumentation in which two parties try to convince each other of their point of view. For example, if you and your friend are debating whether there is a God, you would each present your arguments and try to refute the other’s arguments.
Jalpa is a verbal dispute. It is a form of debate in which the participants are not interested in finding the truth, but only in winning the argument. For example, if you and your friend are arguing about who is the better basketball player, you might start to insult each other and become more interested in winning the argument than in finding the truth.
Vitanda is a form of debate in which the participants attack each other’s character instead of their arguments. For example, if you and your friend are arguing about who is the better basketball player, you might start to make personal attacks on each other instead of focusing on the arguments.
Hetvantara is the introduction of a new argument into a debate. For example, if you and your friend are arguing about whether there is a God, and you have both presented your arguments, you might introduce a new argument into the debate.
Dharsana is a system of philosophy. It is a systematic way of thinking about the world. For example, Nyaya philosophy is a system of philosophy that is based on the pramanas.
Phalam is the result of an action. It is the consequence of something that is done. For example, if you plant a seed, the result of your action is a plant.
The pramanas are the foundation of Nyaya philosophy. They are the means by which we can gain knowledge of the world. The pramanas are used in all aspects of Nyaya philosophy, from logic to ethics to metaphysics.
What is Nyaya Prama?
Nyaya Prama is a system of logic and epistemology in Indian philosophy. It is one of the six Orthodox Schools of Hindu philosophy. The word “Nyaya” means “logical reasoning” and “Prama” means “knowledge”. Nyaya Prama is a system of logic that is used to determine the validity of knowledge claims.
What are the four pramanas?
The four pramanas are perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Perception is the direct experience of an object through the senses. Inference is the process of reasoning from one known fact to another unknown fact. Comparison is the process of determining the similarity between two objects. Testimony is the acceptance of a statement as true on the authority of someone who is considered to be an expert.
What is the difference between perception and inference?
Perception is the direct experience of an object through the senses. Inference is the process of reasoning from one known fact to another unknown fact. For example, if you see a fire, you can perceive the fire directly through your sense of sight. However, if you see smoke, you can infer that there is a fire somewhere nearby.
What is the difference between comparison and testimony?
Comparison is the process of determining the similarity between two objects. Testimony is the acceptance of a statement as true on the authority of someone who is considered to be an expert. For example, if you see two objects that look similar, you can compare them to determine if they are the same object. However, if you hear a statement from someone who is considered to be an expert, you can accept the statement as true on the authority of the expert.
What are the six categories of Nyaya Prama?
The six categories of Nyaya Prama are substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. Substance is the basic entity that exists. Quality is a property of a substance. Action is a change in a substance. Generality is a common property that is shared by multiple substances. Particularity is a unique property that distinguishes one substance from another. Inherence is the relationship between a substance and its properties.
What is the difference between substance and quality?
Substance is the basic entity that exists. Quality is a property of a substance. For example, a table is a substance. The color of the table is a quality of the table.
What is the difference between action and generality?
Action is a change in a substance. Generality is a common property that is shared by multiple substances. For example, the movement of a table is an action of the table. The color of the table is a generality of the table.
What is the difference between particularity and inherence?
Particularity is a unique property that distinguishes one substance from another. Inherence is the relationship between a substance and its properties. For example, the shape of a table is a particularity of the table. The color of the table is an inherence of the table.
What are the four kinds of inference?
The four kinds of inference are deductive inference, inductive inference, analogical inference, and abductive inference. Deductive inference is a type of inference in which the conclusion is certain if the premises are true. Inductive inference is a type of inference in which the conclusion is probable if the premises are true. Analogical inference is a type of inference in which the conclusion is similar to the premises. Abductive inference is a type of inference in which the conclusion is the best explanation for the premises.
What is the difference between deductive inference and inductive inference?
Deductive inference is a type of inference in which the conclusion is certain if the premises are true. Inductive inference is a type of inference in which the conclusion is probable if the premises are true. For example, the following is an example of deductive inference: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. The conclusion of this inference is certain because the premises are true.
What is the difference between analogical inference and abductive inference?
Analogical inference is a type of inference in which the conclusion is similar to the premises. Abductive inference is a type of inference in which the conclusion is the best explanation for the premises. For example, the following is an example of analogical inference: The sun is a star. The stars are hot. Therefore, the sun is hot. The conclusion of this inference is probable because the premises are true.
What is the difference between a valid argument and an invalid argument?
A valid argument is an argument in which the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. An invalid argument is an argument in which the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the
Which of the following is not a pramana (means of valid knowledge) in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) Perception
(B) Inference
(C) Verbal testimony
(D) Comparison
(E) AbsenceWhich of the following is not a type of inference in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) Inference from cause to effect
(B) Inference from effect to cause
(C) Inference from sign to signified
(D) Inference from example to rule
(E) Inference from rule to exampleWhich of the following is not a type of verbal testimony in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) The Vedas
(B) The Smritis
(C) The Puranas
(D) The Agamas
(E) The TantrasWhich of the following is not a type of comparison in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) Comparison of similar things
(B) Comparison of dissimilar things
(C) Comparison of things that are both similar and dissimilar
(D) Comparison of things that are neither similar nor dissimilar
(E) Comparison of things that are both similar and dissimilar, but in different waysWhich of the following is not a type of absence in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) Positive absence
(B) Negative absence
(C) Relative absence
(D) Absolute absence
(E) Mutual absenceWhich of the following is not a type of fallacy in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) The fallacy of the unstated middle term
(B) The fallacy of the undistributed middle term
(C) The fallacy of the four terms
(D) The fallacy of the undistributed minor term
(E) The fallacy of the undistributed major termWhich of the following is not a type of syllogism in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) A categorical syllogism
(B) A hypothetical syllogism
(C) A disjunctive syllogism
(D) An inductive syllogism
(E) A deductive syllogismWhich of the following is not a type of definition in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) A real definition
(B) A nominal definition
(C) A verbal definition
(D) A conceptual definition
(E) A stipulative definitionWhich of the following is not a type of argument in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) A deductive argument
(B) An inductive argument
(C) A valid argument
(D) An invalid argument
(E) A Sound argumentWhich of the following is not a type of inference in Nyaya philosophy?
(A) A deductive inference
(B) An inductive inference
(C) A valid inference
(D) An invalid inference
(E) A sound inference