21. In which one of the following cases had the Supreme Court directed an

In which one of the following cases had the Supreme Court directed an authority to provide drainage system for removal of a public nuisance under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ?

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1986
Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand & Others, 1980
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 2000
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, 1996
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
The question asks for the Supreme Court case where an authority was directed to provide a drainage system for public nuisance under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The case Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand & Others (1980) is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court. In this case, residents complained about public nuisance caused by open drains and accumulation of filth and human excreta due to the municipality’s failure to maintain drainage and sanitation. The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate can issue an order under Section 133 of the CrPC to a local authority (like a municipality) to abate a public nuisance by providing necessary facilities like drainage, and the municipality cannot plead lack of funds as an excuse for failing to perform its statutory duty relating to public health.
While M.C. Mehta cases involved environmental issues and Supreme Court intervention, the Municipal Council, Ratlam case is specifically known for the application and interpretation of Section 133 of the CrPC against a municipal body for ordering drainage and sanitation to abate public nuisance.

22. Which one of the following statements is not correct ?

Which one of the following statements is not correct ?

The Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, exercises powers under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.
The members of the Industrial Tribunal hold office for a maximum period of five years.
The Chairperson and members of the Industrial Tribunal cannot hold office after 65 years of age.
The presiding officer of the Industrial Tribunal must be an independent person.
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
The question asks which statement is *not correct* about Industrial Tribunals under the ID Act, 1947.
A) Industrial Tribunals are constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to adjudicate industrial disputes falling under the Second and Third Schedules of the Act. The Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 has its own enforcement machinery and an Appellate Tribunal under Section 7D to hear appeals against orders of the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or other officers. Industrial Tribunals do *not* exercise powers under the EPF Act. This statement is incorrect.
B) Section 8 of the ID Act states that the presiding officer holds office for the period specified in the appointment order. While the Act doesn’t fix a maximum of five years, rules framed under the Act often specify a tenure, typically around three years, which may be extended. So, a maximum of five years might be true in practice under rules, making this statement potentially correct depending on the specific rules being referred to.
C) Section 7A(3) states that a person shall not be appointed as the presiding officer of a Tribunal if he has attained the age of sixty-five years. This implies they cannot hold office after 65. This statement is correct.
D) Section 7A specifies the qualifications for the presiding officer, which include judicial experience. While the Act doesn’t explicitly use the word “independent” in qualifications for Industrial Tribunals (unlike for assessors in National Tribunals under Section 7B), the role requires impartiality, inherent in a judicial position. This statement is generally considered correct in spirit.
Statement A is factually incorrect regarding the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals. They deal with industrial disputes under the ID Act, not matters under the EPF Act.

23. Under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, what is the maximum

Under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, what is the maximum number of persons constituting the Central Vigilance Commission including the Chairperson ?

Two
Three
Four
Five
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
Section 3 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 provides for the constitution of the Central Vigilance Commission.
According to Section 3(2), the Commission shall consist of: (a) a Central Vigilance Commissioner (who is the Chairperson); and (b) not more than two Vigilance Commissioners. Therefore, the maximum number of persons constituting the Commission, including the Chairperson, is 1 + 2 = 3.
The Central Vigilance Commissioner and the Vigilance Commissioners are appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee consisting of the Prime Minister (Chairperson), the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People.

24. ‘A’ cuts down a tree on ‘B’s land with the intention of dishonestly ta

‘A’ cuts down a tree on ‘B’s land with the intention of dishonestly taking the tree out of ‘B’s possession without ‘B’s consent. What offence is committed by ‘A’ ?

No offence until the tree is taken away
The offence of mischief
The offence of breach of trust
The offence of theft as soon as the tree is severed
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
The scenario describes ‘A’ cutting down a tree on ‘B’s land with the intention of dishonestly taking it without ‘B’s consent. This constitutes the offence of theft under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Theft is defined under Section 378 of the IPC as the dishonest intention of taking any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person’s consent, and moving that property in order to effect such taking. Explanation 1 to Section 378 states that a thing attached to the earth, not being movable property, becomes capable of being the subject of theft as soon as it is severed from the earth. In this case, the tree, once severed by cutting, becomes movable property. The act of cutting down the tree causes it to be moved (e.g., it falls). Since this movement is done with the dishonest intention of taking the tree out of B’s possession without consent, the offence of theft is complete as soon as the tree is severed and consequently moved.
Option A is incorrect because the offence of theft is completed upon severance and movement with dishonest intent, not upon the final carrying away of the property. Option B (mischief) might also be committed by damaging the tree, but the focus of the question is on the dishonest taking, which is theft. Option C (breach of trust) is not applicable as there was no entrustment of property.

25. Which one of the following statements about layoff as stated in Chapte

Which one of the following statements about layoff as stated in Chapter V B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not correct ?

This is applicable to industrial establishments employing not less than 100 workmen on an average per working day for the preceding 12 months.
Prior permission of the appropriate Government or specified authority is necessary before layoff.
The compensation for layoff is twice the compensation as in Chapter V A.
If the Government does not respond within 60 days of receiving the application for permission to layoff, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted.
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
The question asks which statement about layoff in Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is *not correct*.
A) Section 25K states that Chapter VB applies to industrial establishments (other than seasonal/intermittent) employing not less than one hundred workmen on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. This statement is correct.
B) Section 25M(1) requires an employer to obtain prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority before laying off a workman to whom Chapter VB applies. This statement is correct.
C) Section 25M(6) states that where permission for lay-off is granted, the workman shall be entitled to compensation as specified in Section 25C. Section 25C, which is in Chapter VA, provides compensation for lay-off at the rate of fifty per cent. of the total of the basic wages and dearness allowance. Therefore, the compensation for layoff under Chapter VB is the *same* as under Chapter VA (Section 25C), i.e., 50% of wages. The statement that the compensation is *twice* the compensation as in Chapter VA is incorrect.
D) Section 25M(4) states that if the appropriate Government does not communicate refusal within sixty days of the application for permission, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period. This statement is correct.
Chapter VB imposes more stringent conditions (like prior permission) for lay-off, retrenchment, and closure in larger establishments compared to Chapter VA, but the compensation for lay-off itself remains the same (50% of wages) as in Chapter VA.

26. Under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,

Under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, which of the following is the appropriate Government for the employees of an establishment having branches in more than one State ?

The State Government where the dispute has arisen
The Central Government
As decided by the Central Government
The State Government, where the head office of the establishment is situated
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
Section 2(a) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 defines “appropriate Government”.
According to Section 2(a), for an establishment having branches in more than one State, the Central Government is the appropriate Government.
For other establishments (not having branches in more than one State), the appropriate Government is the State Government if the establishment is one specified in the notification by the Central Government, or the Central Government in other cases.

27. Who among the following is not an employee under Section 2 (F) of the

Who among the following is not an employee under Section 2 (F) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 ?

Any person employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise
Any person who gets his salary directly or indirectly from the employer
Any person employed by or through a contractor for his work
Any person engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
Section 2(f) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 defines ’employee’. It states: “’employee’ means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person – (i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment; (ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961, or under the standing orders of the establishment;”.
Options C and D describe persons explicitly included in the definition of ’employee’ under Section 2(f). Option C covers employees employed by or through a contractor [Section 2(f)(i)]. Option D covers apprentices not engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961 [Section 2(f)(ii)]. Therefore, persons described in C and D are employees.

The main part of the definition requires a person to be “employed for wages in any kind of work… in connection with the work of an establishment” AND to “get his wages directly or indirectly from the employer”. Option A describes the first part of this conjunctive requirement. Option B describes the second part (using “salary” for “wages”). A person must satisfy *both* for the main definition to apply.

Option B describes “Any person who gets his salary directly or indirectly from the employer”. Simply receiving a salary (or wages) from the employer does not, in itself, guarantee that the person is “employed for wages in any kind of work… in connection with the work of the establishment” as required by the Act. For instance, a non-executive director receiving director’s fees, or a consultant receiving a fixed monthly payment, might receive funds from the employer but may not be considered “employed for wages” in the specific sense of the Act’s definition covering regular employment relationships in connection with the establishment’s work. Therefore, a person fitting only the description in B is not necessarily an employee under Section 2(f).

Option A (“Any person employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise”) strongly implies the existence of an employment relationship and engagement in the work of the establishment, which is the fundamental basis of the EPF coverage. While incomplete without the condition of getting wages from the employer, it’s a stronger indicator of being a potential employee under the core definition than merely receiving salary. The question asks who is *not* an employee; Option B describes a category where inclusion as an employee is less certain based *solely* on that description, compared to A, C, or D.

28. Notice with respect to any change which affects the conditions of serv

Notice with respect to any change which affects the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the IV Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, shall not be effected within

21 days
60 days
90 days
30 days
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
The correct answer is A) 21 days.
Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 deals with the notice of change in conditions of service. It stipulates that an employer who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule shall not effect such change without giving to the workmen likely to be affected a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected; and within twenty-one days of giving such notice. This means the change cannot be implemented within 21 days of serving the notice.
The Fourth Schedule lists various matters concerning conditions of service that require a notice of change, such as wages, compensatory and other allowances, hours of work and rest intervals, leave with wages and holidays, etc. The purpose of the notice period is to allow for discussion, negotiation, or conciliation before the changes are unilaterally implemented by the employer, thereby promoting industrial peace.

29. ‘A’ is charged with travelling on a train without a ticket. As per the

‘A’ is charged with travelling on a train without a ticket. As per the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, who among the following has to prove that he had a ticket?

‘A’ has to prove it
Guilt is always to be proved by the prosecution
The Court will decide it
It is proved the moment ‘A’ is caught without ticket
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
The correct answer is A) ‘A’ has to prove it.
Under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the general rule is that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts a fact. However, Section 106 of the Act provides an important exception: “When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” Whether a person has a ticket for travelling on a train is a fact that is specifically within their personal knowledge. Therefore, if charged with travelling without a ticket, the burden of proving that they did possess a ticket rests upon the accused (‘A’ in this case).
This principle is applied in various situations where the truth of a matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of one party. It’s an exception to the general rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this specific scenario, proving the negative (that ‘A’ did *not* have a ticket) is difficult for the prosecution, while proving the positive (that ‘A’ *did* have a ticket) is straightforward for ‘A’ if it is true.

30. As per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if a contract

As per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if a contract is contained in several letters, what must be proved?

Any one letter in which the contract is contained must be proved
Any letter which has the conclusion of the letter must be proved
All the letters in which the contract is contained must be proved
Only that letter of contract must be proved which has the disputed portion
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2018
The correct answer is C) All the letters in which the contract is contained must be proved.
When a contract is contained in a series of letters, the entire series of letters collectively constitutes the documentary evidence of the contract. According to the principles of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, particularly Section 91, when the terms of a contract have been reduced to the form of a document or a series of documents, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract except the document itself or secondary evidence where permissible. If the contract is formed through correspondence, all the letters that form part of and evidence the terms of the contract must be produced or accounted for (if the original is lost, secondary evidence may be given). Proving only one letter, or only the concluding one, or only the disputed portion in isolation would not give a complete and accurate picture of the entire contractual agreement.
This principle ensures that the court considers the entirety of the written agreement to understand its true nature and effect. The court must look at the whole correspondence to determine if a contract was formed and what its terms are.