141. Which one of the following offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860,

Which one of the following offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is cognizable and non-bailable?

[amp_mcq option1=”Sedition” option2=”Joining an unlawful assembly armed with a gun” option3=”Rioting with a deadly weapon” option4=”Bribery” correct=”option3″]

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The question asks which of the listed offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, is cognizable and non-bailable. The classification of offences (cognizable/non-cognizable, bailable/non-bailable) is provided in the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
A) Sedition (Section 124A IPC) is classified as Cognizable, Non-bailable, and triable by the Court of Session.
B) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with a deadly weapon (Section 144 IPC) is classified as Cognizable, but Bailable, and triable by a Magistrate of the first class. A gun is a deadly weapon, so option B describes an offence under Section 144.
C) Rioting, armed with a deadly weapon (Section 148 IPC) is classified as Cognizable, Non-bailable, and triable by a Magistrate of the first class.
D) Bribery: If referring to Election Bribery (Section 171E IPC), it is classified as Non-cognizable and Bailable. If referring to bribery involving public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, such offences are generally Cognizable and Non-bailable. However, the question specifies offences “under the Indian Penal Code, 1860”, making Section 171E the relevant reference, which is Non-cognizable and Bailable.
Based on the CrPC First Schedule classification of IPC offences, both Sedition (Section 124A) and Rioting, armed with a deadly weapon (Section 148) are Cognizable and Non-bailable. Given that only one option can be correct, and both A and C fit the criteria, there might be an ambiguity in the question as presented. However, comparing the typical examples of such offences in legal studies, Section 148 is a standard illustration of a Cognizable, Non-bailable offence related to public order, triable by a Magistrate. Section 124A, while also C&NB, is triable by the Court of Session and relates to offences against the State. Without further context or clarification, both A and C are legally classified as Cognizable and Non-bailable. If forced to choose one, C is often cited as a clear example of a C&NB offence triable by a Magistrate.

142. ‘A’ was at work with a hatchet with full precautions. While working, t

‘A’ was at work with a hatchet with full precautions. While working, the head of the hatchet flies off and kills a man who was standing nearby. ‘A’ has committed no crime under which one of the following Sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ?

[amp_mcq option1=”Section 80″ option2=”Section 81″ option3=”Section 86″ option4=”Section 89″ correct=”option1″]

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The scenario describes an act done by ‘A’ with full precautions, resulting in an accidental death when the hatchet head flies off. This falls under the general exception of ‘Accident’ in the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Section 80 of the IPC states that “Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner, by lawful means, and with proper care and caution.” ‘A’ was engaged in a lawful act (working with a tool) in a lawful manner (“with full precautions” – implying proper care and caution). The death was caused by an accident or misfortune (hatchet head flying off) without criminal intention or knowledge. Therefore, under Section 80, ‘A’ has committed no crime.
Section 81 applies when an act is done to prevent other harm. Section 86 relates to offences committed while intoxicated. Section 89 relates to acts done for the benefit of a child or insane person with guardian’s consent. None of these apply to the given scenario.

143. Under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a witness summoned by a Court of

Under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a witness summoned by a Court of Law to produce a document which is in his possession has to do which one of the following?

[amp_mcq option1=”Shall bring it to the Court notwithstanding any objection” option2=”May refuse to bring it in the interest of national security” option3=”May refuse to bring it on the ground of confidentiality” option4=”Shall produce before the Court only if there is no objection” correct=”option1″]

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Section 162 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governs the production of documents summoned by a Court.
Section 162 states: “A witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided by the Court.” This means the witness is obligated to bring the document regardless of any objection; the objection is for the Court to consider regarding its admissibility or inspection, not a ground for the witness to refuse production.
Options B and C are incorrect as a witness cannot refuse to bring the document based on national security or confidentiality; these are grounds for objection to admissibility or inspection which the Court will rule upon after the document is produced. Option D is contrary to the mandatory requirement of Section 162.

144. In which one of the following cases had the Supreme Court directed an

In which one of the following cases had the Supreme Court directed an authority to provide drainage system for removal of a public nuisance under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ?

[amp_mcq option1=”M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1986″ option2=”Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand & Others, 1980″ option3=”M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 2000″ option4=”Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, 1996″ correct=”option2″]

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The question asks for the Supreme Court case where an authority was directed to provide a drainage system for public nuisance under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The case Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand & Others (1980) is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court. In this case, residents complained about public nuisance caused by open drains and accumulation of filth and human excreta due to the municipality’s failure to maintain drainage and sanitation. The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate can issue an order under Section 133 of the CrPC to a local authority (like a municipality) to abate a public nuisance by providing necessary facilities like drainage, and the municipality cannot plead lack of funds as an excuse for failing to perform its statutory duty relating to public health.
While M.C. Mehta cases involved environmental issues and Supreme Court intervention, the Municipal Council, Ratlam case is specifically known for the application and interpretation of Section 133 of the CrPC against a municipal body for ordering drainage and sanitation to abate public nuisance.

145. Which one of the following statements is not correct ?

Which one of the following statements is not correct ?

[amp_mcq option1=”The Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, exercises powers under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.” option2=”The members of the Industrial Tribunal hold office for a maximum period of five years.” option3=”The Chairperson and members of the Industrial Tribunal cannot hold office after 65 years of age.” option4=”The presiding officer of the Industrial Tribunal must be an independent person.” correct=”option1″]

This question was previously asked in
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The question asks which statement is *not correct* about Industrial Tribunals under the ID Act, 1947.
A) Industrial Tribunals are constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to adjudicate industrial disputes falling under the Second and Third Schedules of the Act. The Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 has its own enforcement machinery and an Appellate Tribunal under Section 7D to hear appeals against orders of the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or other officers. Industrial Tribunals do *not* exercise powers under the EPF Act. This statement is incorrect.
B) Section 8 of the ID Act states that the presiding officer holds office for the period specified in the appointment order. While the Act doesn’t fix a maximum of five years, rules framed under the Act often specify a tenure, typically around three years, which may be extended. So, a maximum of five years might be true in practice under rules, making this statement potentially correct depending on the specific rules being referred to.
C) Section 7A(3) states that a person shall not be appointed as the presiding officer of a Tribunal if he has attained the age of sixty-five years. This implies they cannot hold office after 65. This statement is correct.
D) Section 7A specifies the qualifications for the presiding officer, which include judicial experience. While the Act doesn’t explicitly use the word “independent” in qualifications for Industrial Tribunals (unlike for assessors in National Tribunals under Section 7B), the role requires impartiality, inherent in a judicial position. This statement is generally considered correct in spirit.
Statement A is factually incorrect regarding the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals. They deal with industrial disputes under the ID Act, not matters under the EPF Act.

146. Under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, what is the maximum

Under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, what is the maximum number of persons constituting the Central Vigilance Commission including the Chairperson ?

[amp_mcq option1=”Two” option2=”Three” option3=”Four” option4=”Five” correct=”option2″]

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Section 3 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 provides for the constitution of the Central Vigilance Commission.
According to Section 3(2), the Commission shall consist of: (a) a Central Vigilance Commissioner (who is the Chairperson); and (b) not more than two Vigilance Commissioners. Therefore, the maximum number of persons constituting the Commission, including the Chairperson, is 1 + 2 = 3.
The Central Vigilance Commissioner and the Vigilance Commissioners are appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee consisting of the Prime Minister (Chairperson), the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People.

147. ‘A’ cuts down a tree on ‘B’s land with the intention of dishonestly ta

‘A’ cuts down a tree on ‘B’s land with the intention of dishonestly taking the tree out of ‘B’s possession without ‘B’s consent. What offence is committed by ‘A’ ?

[amp_mcq option1=”No offence until the tree is taken away” option2=”The offence of mischief” option3=”The offence of breach of trust” option4=”The offence of theft as soon as the tree is severed” correct=”option4″]

This question was previously asked in
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The scenario describes ‘A’ cutting down a tree on ‘B’s land with the intention of dishonestly taking it without ‘B’s consent. This constitutes the offence of theft under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Theft is defined under Section 378 of the IPC as the dishonest intention of taking any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person’s consent, and moving that property in order to effect such taking. Explanation 1 to Section 378 states that a thing attached to the earth, not being movable property, becomes capable of being the subject of theft as soon as it is severed from the earth. In this case, the tree, once severed by cutting, becomes movable property. The act of cutting down the tree causes it to be moved (e.g., it falls). Since this movement is done with the dishonest intention of taking the tree out of B’s possession without consent, the offence of theft is complete as soon as the tree is severed and consequently moved.
Option A is incorrect because the offence of theft is completed upon severance and movement with dishonest intent, not upon the final carrying away of the property. Option B (mischief) might also be committed by damaging the tree, but the focus of the question is on the dishonest taking, which is theft. Option C (breach of trust) is not applicable as there was no entrustment of property.

148. Which one of the following statements about layoff as stated in Chapte

Which one of the following statements about layoff as stated in Chapter V B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not correct ?

[amp_mcq option1=”This is applicable to industrial establishments employing not less than 100 workmen on an average per working day for the preceding 12 months.” option2=”Prior permission of the appropriate Government or specified authority is necessary before layoff.” option3=”The compensation for layoff is twice the compensation as in Chapter V A.” option4=”If the Government does not respond within 60 days of receiving the application for permission to layoff, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted.” correct=”option3″]

This question was previously asked in
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The question asks which statement about layoff in Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is *not correct*.
A) Section 25K states that Chapter VB applies to industrial establishments (other than seasonal/intermittent) employing not less than one hundred workmen on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months. This statement is correct.
B) Section 25M(1) requires an employer to obtain prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority before laying off a workman to whom Chapter VB applies. This statement is correct.
C) Section 25M(6) states that where permission for lay-off is granted, the workman shall be entitled to compensation as specified in Section 25C. Section 25C, which is in Chapter VA, provides compensation for lay-off at the rate of fifty per cent. of the total of the basic wages and dearness allowance. Therefore, the compensation for layoff under Chapter VB is the *same* as under Chapter VA (Section 25C), i.e., 50% of wages. The statement that the compensation is *twice* the compensation as in Chapter VA is incorrect.
D) Section 25M(4) states that if the appropriate Government does not communicate refusal within sixty days of the application for permission, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period. This statement is correct.
Chapter VB imposes more stringent conditions (like prior permission) for lay-off, retrenchment, and closure in larger establishments compared to Chapter VA, but the compensation for lay-off itself remains the same (50% of wages) as in Chapter VA.

149. Under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,

Under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, which of the following is the appropriate Government for the employees of an establishment having branches in more than one State ?

[amp_mcq option1=”The State Government where the dispute has arisen” option2=”The Central Government” option3=”As decided by the Central Government” option4=”The State Government, where the head office of the establishment is situated” correct=”option2″]

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Section 2(a) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 defines “appropriate Government”.
According to Section 2(a), for an establishment having branches in more than one State, the Central Government is the appropriate Government.
For other establishments (not having branches in more than one State), the appropriate Government is the State Government if the establishment is one specified in the notification by the Central Government, or the Central Government in other cases.

150. Who among the following is not an employee under Section 2 (F) of the

Who among the following is not an employee under Section 2 (F) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 ?

[amp_mcq option1=”Any person employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise” option2=”Any person who gets his salary directly or indirectly from the employer” option3=”Any person employed by or through a contractor for his work” option4=”Any person engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961″ correct=”option2″]

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Section 2(f) of the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 defines ’employee’. It states: “’employee’ means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person – (i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment; (ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961, or under the standing orders of the establishment;”.
Options C and D describe persons explicitly included in the definition of ’employee’ under Section 2(f). Option C covers employees employed by or through a contractor [Section 2(f)(i)]. Option D covers apprentices not engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961 [Section 2(f)(ii)]. Therefore, persons described in C and D are employees.

The main part of the definition requires a person to be “employed for wages in any kind of work… in connection with the work of an establishment” AND to “get his wages directly or indirectly from the employer”. Option A describes the first part of this conjunctive requirement. Option B describes the second part (using “salary” for “wages”). A person must satisfy *both* for the main definition to apply.

Option B describes “Any person who gets his salary directly or indirectly from the employer”. Simply receiving a salary (or wages) from the employer does not, in itself, guarantee that the person is “employed for wages in any kind of work… in connection with the work of the establishment” as required by the Act. For instance, a non-executive director receiving director’s fees, or a consultant receiving a fixed monthly payment, might receive funds from the employer but may not be considered “employed for wages” in the specific sense of the Act’s definition covering regular employment relationships in connection with the establishment’s work. Therefore, a person fitting only the description in B is not necessarily an employee under Section 2(f).

Option A (“Any person employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise”) strongly implies the existence of an employment relationship and engagement in the work of the establishment, which is the fundamental basis of the EPF coverage. While incomplete without the condition of getting wages from the employer, it’s a stronger indicator of being a potential employee under the core definition than merely receiving salary. The question asks who is *not* an employee; Option B describes a category where inclusion as an employee is less certain based *solely* on that description, compared to A, C, or D.