A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public

A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies. The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way is

relevant, but it will not operate as estoppels
irrelevant, but it may be considered
a conclusive proof that the right of way exists
relevant, but not a conclusive proof that the right of way exists
This question was previously asked in
UPSC CISF-AC-EXE – 2019
Option D is correct. The relevancy of judgments relating to matters of a public nature is governed by Section 42 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It states that judgments, orders, or decrees which relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the inquiry are relevant, but they are *not conclusive proof* of that which they state.
– The existence of a public right of way is a matter of public nature.
– A previous decree concerning the same public right of way in a suit between one party and a third party is relevant in a subsequent suit.
– However, such a previous decree is only admissible as evidence and does not conclusively prove the existence of the right; other evidence is still required to establish the fact.
– Section 40 deals with relevancy of judgments as res judicata. Section 41 deals with relevancy of certain judgments in probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction (judgments in rem). Section 42 deals with judgments relating to matters of public nature. Section 43 makes all other judgments irrelevant, unless they are relevant under some other section of the Act. The scenario fits Section 42.
– Estoppel would apply between the parties to the *first* suit (A and C) or their representatives regarding the specific issue decided, but not automatically bind B in a separate suit (A vs B).
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